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The survival of kemalism
Sami ZUBAIDA
1 Kemalism,  and in particular  its  secularist  components,  occupies  an ambigious site  in
Turkish public life today. It remains, officially, the state ideology. "Respectable" political
figures, including the leadership of the (islamic) Refah Partisi (Welfare Party), affirm their
adherence to its basic tenets. Those who attack it in public, mostly Islamists nowadays,
are doing so consciously to break conventions and taboos. To advocate the application of
the seriat,  for instance,  is  reprehensible and "extremist".  The term seriaitçi,  is used to
discredit public figures with islamic leanings. Unlike their counterparts in other Middle
Eastern  countries,  the  maistream  islamic  leaders  in  Turkey  are  restrained  on  this
question. The programme of the Refah Partisi includes many elements of economic and
nationalist  statism,  and its  leader,  Erbakan,  declared  at  one  point  that  he  is  devletçi 
("statist", a term associated with Kemalism).
2 In practice, however, secularist or laiklik principles are widely flouted. This is not new, but
goes back historically to the first triumph of the Democrat Party in the first free elections
in 1950. One of the principal constituencies of this party were provincial conservatives.
Many of the rigours imposed on religious practice by Ataturk were relaxed, including,
crucially, the return to the Arabic izan (call to prayer). Since then, Islam has gradually re-
emerged in public life and in many social spheres, including, crucially, education and
politics.
3 The rise and increasing success of an Islamic party (under different names since its first
emergence  in  the  1960's,  currently  the  Refah  Partisi  (RP),  or  Welfare  Party),  and  its
participation in government coalitions in the 1970's, are in direct contravention of one of
thé basic principles of thé Kemalist constitution : that no political party should be formed
on the basis of religion, class or ethnicity. Sufi orders, which were banished by Atatürk,
have  emerged  under  the  guise  of  charities  and  vakifs (foundations)  some  of  which,
notably some
4 Naksibandi offshoots, command great wealth and influence. The leading elites of Özal's
Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party) in the 1980's, including Özal himself, were Naksi.
Many leading parliamentarv deputies of the currently ruling DYP (Right Path Party)
are  outspoken supporters  of  Islamic  causes,  most  notably  the  periodic  attempts  to
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restore Aya Sofia as a mosque, in direct contravention of Atatürk's decree which made
it a non-religious monument.
5 The Ministry of Education is known to be controlled by high functionaries with Islamic
inclinations.  School  curricula,  school  books  and  teacher  recruitment  reflect  these
commitments.  Imam-Hatip  schools  have the ostensible  function of  training religious
functionaries.  In  practice  many  of  them  provide  mainstream  secondary  education
alongside  a  religious  curriculum.  In  addition,  religious  organizations  and  vakifs,
notably the Fethullahci (Nurcu) organization, fund an extensive network of schools and
educational  charities.  The  graduates  of  these  religious  schools  are  increasingly
represented in elite university faculties, such as the Ankara University Political Science
Faculty, which lead to high ranking government posts.
6 It is widely noted that the Kemalist laiklik doctrines were never "secular" in the sense of
the separation of religion from politics. Instead, it has meant the control of religion by
the state. What we have witnessed over thé years is the erosion of this control, the
emergence of autonomous religious organizations,  and their increasing influence in
public life.
7 Kemalism remains, however, the "foundation myth" of the Turkish state, and Turkish
political  culture  remains  overwhelmiingly  statist.  Mainstream  Islamists  are  no  less
committed to a strong nationalist state than the other main political parties. They see
Islam as an integral part of this national/nationalist identity, and in this they are no
different from leading elements in the two major parties of the right. Apart from Kurdish
parties, only marginal, though important and interesting groups express opposition to
Kemalist statism : the economic and social liberals, sometimes referred to as "Second
Republicans", who are associated with Cem Boyner's New Democracy Movement, anti-
statist Muslim intellectuals such as the group associated with Ali Bulaç, and groups of the
left who are now active in the defence of human rights.
8 It is the very fact of increasing Islamic influence and electoral success which is giving a
new impetus to Kemalist loyalties and advocacies.  Powerful and influential  sectors in
Turkish public life espouse strong secularist identification and see political Islam as a
threat to their interests and, crucially, styles of life. The "modern" middle and upper
classes of Istanbul and Ankara, including the leading political families,  officers of the
armed forces and the most prominent sectors of writers and joumalists are all ranged in
this laiklik camp. Their allegiance is tied to profound social divisions, of a class and a
regional nature, which are at the core of contemporary Turkish society. The bourgeoisie
of  Istanbul  in  particular  associate  Islamic  advocacy  with  the  massive  Anatolian
migrations into the city. The poor of the ever expanding gecekondus, the multitude of
constructions, legal and illicit, which are changing the face of the city, the crowding, the
traffic, the pollution, all these are seen as an invasion and ever present threat to their city
and their way of life. It is not only the poor, but, also crucially, the nouveau riche, also
from Anatolia, who are equally held responsible for the deterioration of the city from
property speculation, ugly constructions and corruption in Mafia-like activitv. For the
Istanbul bourgeoisie, this Anatolian invasion is the barbarians not just at the gate, but
now in the very heart of the city. Islam is firmly associated by them with this Anatolian
invasion : the poor provide the votes for the Islamic party and the rich finance it; indeed,
one hears frequently that these votes are bought. The poor reciprocate these sentiments
: they feel the contempt of their compatriots which adds to their feelings of deprivation
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and inferiorisation. They call their social superiors "Beyaz Türk", White Turks, which
gives a racial dimension to the conflict.
9 The success of the RP in the municipal elections of March 1994, and the triumphalist
demonstrations by pro-Islamic forces, mostly young men, in the following days in Ankara
and Istanbul heightened the fears of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. The demonstrators
openly  demanded,  among  other  things,  the  defeat  of  the  laiklik  state  and  the
implementation  of  the  seriat.  The  effect  on  the  secular  bourgeoisie  was  traumatic.
Cumhuriyet, the organ of laiklik in Turkey, was indignant at the fact that the seriat could
be openly demanded with impunity. To the secularists the demonstrations showed the
true colours of political Islam, removing the veil drawn by the insincere moderate stance
of RP leaders and other respectable Muslims. The seriat to them means women in veils,
segregation of  the sexes in public places,  the end of  arts and entertainments,  of  the
meyhanes, clubs and theatres so much part of the modem, European style of life so central
to their identity. It is a backward step, irtica, to an Asiatic closed society.
10 These, then, are the forces and sentiments behind the demands for the reiteration and
the enforcement of  the secularist  founding principles  of  the Republic,  to banish and
suppress the Islamic menace. The Özal regime in the 1980's saw the relaxation of Kemalist
principles and even some rituals, such as the commemoration of Atatürk's death by a
complete standstill at 9.05, the hour of his death on 10 November 1938. In the liberal
atmosphere of that regime, these steps did not arouse undue alarm. With the "Islamic
threat", however, there are now insistent demands on the authorities and media to affirm
Kemalist principles,  and to observe the Republican rituals.  On 10 November 1995, for
instance, it was reported that large crowds processed to Atatürk's mausoleum in Ankara,
most  major newspapers gave their  front  pages to Atatürk feaures,  most  radio and TV
stations  interrupted their  diffusion at  9.05,  and those that  did not  faced a  barrage of
complaints.  In  many places  traffic  came to  a  respectful  standstill  at  that  hour.  Many
newspapers and organizations marked the occasion with strong statements on Atatürk's
principles of modernityy, science, reason and secularism, all these being the preconditions
for democracy. Kemalism, it would seem, is alive and well.
11 In this contested political field, the power of Kemalism remains as that of a state religion,
much like socialism in the former communist world. As state religion, it is used a weapon in
public disputations, bent by each side to its own stance. President Demirel and former Prime
Minister  Çiller,  for  instance,  maintain  a  facade  of  Kemalism,  always  insisting  on  the
inviolable,  secular nature of the Turkish state.  This is not only obeissance to the state
religion, but also for international consumption , a firmly secular Turkey is presented to
Western governments and public opinion as a bastion of democracy against the dark forces
of  fundamentalism  sweeping  the  region.  This  stance  is  taken  in  the  ideological
confrontations with the RP. A notable occasion was in March 1994, in the campaigning for
the municipal elections. In the face of opinion polls giving the RP considerable chances of
winning, Çiller played the Kemalist/laiklik card by calling a rally of all the secular forces in
Taksim Square. This was widely seen as an electoral gimmick, and the only leaders to appear
at her side in the rally were those of the loyal SHP (Social Democrats) coalition partners and
the MHP's (Nationalist Party) Alparslan Türkes. who has a close affiliation with Çiller. At the
same time, both Demirel  and Çiller have made sure that they appear in the media on
religious occasions as pious observers of the faith. Examples of such occasions were the
funerals of political notables, in which the two leaders were shown alongside the officiating
imam, Çiller with her head covered, standing in supplication with two cupped hands in
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front. The cynicism of observers is strengthened by the tolerance of both leaders for the
activities of pro-Islamic deputies and notables in their own party. It is clearly perceived that
these leaders are playing politics with both religion and secularism.
12 One of the elements of the lingering force of Kemalism is that it is a "reference ideology".
That is to say, all political and ideological constructions have to refer to it, to situate
themselves in relation to it, if not to justify themselves in its terms. Religious ideology is
no exception.  Kemalism inferiorised religion in terms of modernity and progress :  in
these terms religion is  "reaction",  irtica and conservative/backward.  Being modem is
being secular. Modernism and secularism are associated with Western models, extending
to  the  minutiae  of  everyday  life,  such  as  dress,  family  relations  and  personal
comportment.  The traditional  religious  response  is  to  reject  all  this  as  heresy  and
innovation, but to keep quiet about it in public, in many respects confirming the negative
image of religion so advanced. A more interesting response is to challenge this view of
modemity and progress in terms of another in which faith and conviction play an
important part. Such was the thought of Said Nursi from the early years of the Republic,
and of the Nurcu movement he founded and which continues to be an important feature
of the present political scene. He held a view of science and modemity which accorded
with religious ideas and with pan-theistic themes of Sufi Islam.
13 Many cultural and political elements in modem Turkish Islam are concerned to counter
the  Kemalist  image  of  religion.  Muslim  businessmen  (with  their  own  organization,
MÜSIAD)  point  out  that  many  modem  and  successful  enterpreneurs  and  leaders  of
business in America and Europe are devout Christians and Jews, and make no secret of it.
Why, then, they ask, should Turkish businessmen abandon their religious heritage in the
name of modernity and progress ? In fact, there is no contradiction. Political leaders are
constantly harping on there themes. One set of slogans in recent electoral campaigns is
that it is not us, the Muslims, who are reactionary and conservative, but them the laiklik 
who keep fast to their old outdated ideas, while we, Muslims, are introducing innovative
ideas and policies for a new society, economy and world order. The more respectable
leaders emphasise that their stances and policies do not contradict the spirit of Atatürk,
his Turkish nationalism with the state at its centre. Only, religion is held to bc a central
part of that nation, and should, as such, be represented in the state.
14 There is, then, a broad consensus in mainstream Turkish politics on nationalist statism,
largely faithful to the spirit of Atatürk. The element at issue is the laiklik principle. Can
we have Kemalism without secularism ? Given the firm historical association between the
two,  written  into  the  Republican  constitution,  and  the  iconic  place  Kemalism  (with
secularism) occupies in public life, Kemalism without secularism is inconceivable. The
electoral success of the Islamic party, and the increasing religious influence in public life
will only strengthen the re-assertion of Kemalist secularist principles by the social forces
to whom they represent a guarantee of decent life. With the added support of dominant
sectors of the military, Kemalist secularism is likely to be invoked and re-invoked against
the religious forces. In the meantime, mainstream politicians, religious and secular will
continue to play politics with religion and secularism.
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ABSTRACTS
Kemalism is the founding myth of the Turkish Republic, and secularism is an integral part of it. It
has become a « reference ideology » for all subsequent generations and to the present, in the
sense that all discourses in political contest, including the Islamist, situate themselves in relation
to it. The taboos it imposed on these discourses, notably that on the advocacy of the ºeriat, remain
largely unbroken except by outright rebels and « extremists ».  The respectable leaders of the
Islamist party pay lip service to it, and even claim its mantel in defence of the Turkish nation and
the state as its core, but with the addition of Islam as an essential component of heritage. In
practice,  however,  this ideological hegemony has been gradually eroded from the 1950's,  but
significantly  in  recent  times,  not  only  by  the  rise  and  electoral  success  of  Islamic  political
advocacy,  but  also  throught  the  prominence  of  different  Muslim  forces  and  institutions  in
various spheres of public life and dicourse : education, media, publishing, political parties and
government service and in terms of general public visibility. This has led to the sharpening of
social tensions between the religious and the secular, superimposed on divisions of class, styles
of life and regional affiliations. The affirmation of Kemalism and secularism becomes an essential
line  of  defence  for  the  Westernized  bourgeoisie  of  the  main  cities  and the  institutions  they
control, especially in the media and the political class, and the military is their main refuge.
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